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ABSTRACT This paper studies video streaming from a source to multiple receivers in wireless networks.
The video is streamed with the help of intermediate users who forward the video to others. Two main
challenges affect user satisfaction in this network. The users usually have 1) different willingness to
contribute (forwarding the video), and; 2) different preferences regarding the video quality. To overcome
the challenges, we propose a framework based on an incentive/taxation mechanism in which the forwarding
users, depending on their spent energy, are paid by their corresponding receivers. The video is layered
such that the more video layers are received, the higher the quality-of-experience (QoE) and the higher
the price. Using a decentralized game-theoretic algorithm, we define a user-specific utility function whose
maximization determines the number of video layers a user wishes to receive. The utility function captures
the user’s preferences including the importance of the video quality to her and her willingness to contribute.
Our model supports the multicast transmission by which the receivers can use a common forwarder and share
the cost. The simulation results show that the proposed model not only provides a higher QoE for the users
compared to the preference-agnostic models but also improves the network social-welfare.
INDEX TERMS Game theory, incentive mechanism, multi-hop networks, quality-of-experience, video
streaming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Video applications are expected to occupy 75 percent of
mobile data traffic by 2022 [1]. It is also well-known
that the future generations of communication networks are
highly human-centric where the expectations of users regard-
ing the video quality increase over time [2]. In such a
video-dominated network, providing high-quality video ser-
vice for users and meeting their expectations is difficult.
Multi-hop communication is envisioned as a technique for
tackling this problem by improving the capacity of future
wireless networks, for instance by exploiting the caching
capabilities of wireless nodes and offloading the traffic from
the infrastructure-based networks [3]. Nevertheless, to have
an efficient user-centric multi-hop network, a few critical
challenges need to be addressed.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Gaurav Bhatia.
The first challenge is regarding the deployment of a
multi-hop network. Since the nodes in a wireless network
are resource constrained, having an energy-efficient multi-
hop communication is of high importance, especially in video
streaming scenarios where the data rate that has to be trans-
mitted is relatively high. For the sake of energy efficiency
in a multi-hop communication, an overlay network has to
be constructed given the available physical links so as to
determine the set of nodes that need to forward the video
packets to others. In such a case, the success of a tech-
nique like multi-hop transmission in a user-centric network
depends highly on the users’ willingness to contribute to the
network [4].
This issue brings us to the second challenge: incentive
mechanism for user’s contribution. Studies show that users
are reluctant to contribute to networks without receiving
a proper reward [5]. Unlike traditional networks where the
users did not havemany degrees of freedom in deciding on the
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behavior of their device in a network, thanks to the advances
in software engineering and the popularity of smart devices,
the level at which users nowadays interact with their devices
significantly increased. The users are now able to simply set
their personal preferences and thus, determine the way their
device has to act in a network. In a multi-hop transmission,
the contribution of a user who is located closer to the source
than the others, in forwarding the video, can determine the
quality of the video received by other users.
While the first two challenges are independent of the
application, in a video streaming scenario, the user’s satis-
faction concerning the video quality is critical. One of the
main drawbacks of the existing video streaming algorithms
is that they treat the users as a homogeneous set. Typically
these approaches target a certain level of quality-of-service
(QoS) for everyone and ignore the preference of individual
users [6], [7]. In reality, besides the willingness to contribute,
each user of the network, depending on different parameters
such as the content of the video, user’s age, size of the device’s
screen, etc., may have a different preference regarding the
video quality. Hence, the third challenge is to incorporate the
preferences of individual users in overlay network construc-
tion and video streaming.
Several questions have to be answered in order to tackle
these challenges concerning: i) Incentive mechanism: How
to provide an incentive for a transmitting user who consumes
her energy resource for others? ii) Contribution impact:
How to reward a user based on the significance of her con-
tribution? For instance, the contribution of a user closer to
the source is more crucial than of the one close to the edge.
iii) Overlay network construction: How to construct an
overlay network in a decentralized manner and guarantee
its convergence? iv) Fairness: When multiple users with
different requirements use a common transmitting node, how
the receiving users can be treated in a fair manner regarding
the reward that the transmitter may ask? v)User preferences:
How the overlay network has to be constructed based on the
individual preference of the users, that is, the user willingness
to contribute to the network and the video quality she wishes
to perceive? The questions mentioned above interact with
each other and, hence, addressing them requires a unified
design from a socio-economic perspective.
In this paper, we propose a decentralized game-theoretic
algorithm for joint video quality adaptation and overlay net-
work creation in a multi-hop wireless network with one
source and multiple receivers. To provide an incentive for the
contributing users, the receiving users in this network pay
their corresponding transmitting users via virtual currency.
Further, to preserve the overlay network energy-efficiency,
we design our algorithm based on a cost-sharing game.
The cost of transmission in such a game is shared among
the receiving users of a transmitter which not only reduces
the cost of the receiving users but also helps in network
energy-efficiency by exploiting the multicast transmission.
Moreover, we propose a mechanism in our model which
provides a higher reward for the users whose contribution
has a higher impact on the video quality perceived by the
others. In our model, we capture the preferences of the users
concerning the video quality an individual user wishes to
obtain and her preferred level of contribution to the network.
With our algorithm, the users with higher willingness to
contribute, regarding the energy they spend on delivering the
video to others, are able to perceive a better video quality.
In this work, our objective is to improve the social welfare and
the quality-of-experience (QoE) of the users while preserving
the network energy efficiency.
A. RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS
While prior research on multimedia transmission over wire-
less networks hasmostly focused theQoS constraints [8], [9],
there has been a shift in recent years towards the QoE
as a more suitable metric for performance evaluation of
multimedia contents [10] via measures like the mean opin-
ion score (MOS) [11] or pseudo-subjective quality assess-
ment (PSQA) [9]. Despite a variety of works on QoE-based
network optimization, the consideration of the individual
user preferences has been largely ignored. Researchers have
recently started taking this point into account, e.g., in video
caching [12] or content offloading [4]. The most relevant
work to our present work is [4] where the authors con-
sider the willingness of the users in helping each other for
data offloading. In their work, users form different groups
based on their content preferences and share the content with
inter-group and intra-group users at different sharing prob-
abilities to maximize the offloading gain. The work present
in [4] depends on probabilistic decisions, while in a video
application, we need to optimize the network based on users’
deterministic preferences. Moreover, the proposed approach
does not address the incentive mechanism issue.
Clearly, the success in a user-centric network depends
on the contribution of the users for which a variety of
incentive mechanisms have been proposed during the past
two decades. These approaches are either based on tit-for-
tat [13], reputation [14], taxation [7] or payment via virtual
currency [15]. The tit-for-tat is simple but has a limited
application [16]. In reputation-based mechanisms, a node
cannot ask the other nodes for relaying her message if her rep-
utation is lower than a threshold. She needs to help others and
obtain positive reputation [16]. In [7], a taxation mechanism
has been proposed for video streaming in a wired peer-to-peer
network in which the users experience a higher download rate
if they transmit to a higher number of nodes.
The main drawback of the existing incentive mechanisms
is that they try to balance the incoming and outgoing QoS
measures for a node, like the download and the upload
rates [7]. As mentioned earlier, in a tree structure, the con-
tributions of different nodes have different impacts on the
service quality the users experience even if they receive and
forward the same number of packets. In one of the early works
on incentive mechanisms in tree-based multi-hop transmis-
sion in [17], the authors propose a simple reward function
by which a given forwarding user is rewarded based on the
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number of nodes that rely on her contribution for receiving
data. Although in this way the nodes closer to the source
receive a higher reward, the proposed solution can just be
applied to a pre-constructed network via an access point.
Moreover, it ignores the level of resource consumption at the
nodes. Our proposed mechanism in this work is a combina-
tion of payment and taxation. The payment by the receiving
users in our model depends on the energy the transmitting
users spend. We further propose a taxation mechanism by
which every node has to pay a percentage of her reward to
her respective parent nodes. By doing so, the nodes closer to
the source will automatically end up with a higher reward.
In addition to user satisfaction and providing high QoE for
the users, one has to maintain the energy efficiency of the net-
work. Many algorithms have been proposed during the past
years for decentralized network construction, e.g., based on
the Bellman-Ford algorithm [18] or game-theory [19]. Our
present work is built upon our recent work [20] where we
proposed a model that streams a video in a network by taking
cross-layer parameters into account. In this paper, we extend
our work on using a game-theoretic overlay network creation
algorithm based on a cost-sharing game with an in-depth
analysis. The algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a Nash
equilibrium and, unlike the approach proposed in [19], it sup-
ports multicast transmission and power control at the nodes.
In summary, the main properties of our proposed algorithm
are as follows: i) it rewards the users based on the importance
of their contribution for the network, ii) it considers the
individual user preferences in overlay network construction,
iii) it supports multicast transmission and transmit power
control and hence, it is suitable for wireless networks, and
iv) it is fair in terms of the cost allocation to the users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the video and network models. Section III explains
our proposed game-theoretic video streaming algorithm.
In Section IV the simulation results are presented and finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. NETWORK AND SYSTEM MODELS
A. NETWORK AND VIDEO PROPERTIES
A wireless network is considered composed of N + 1 nodes,
with a source S that intends to stream a video to a set P of
N other nodes. The set Q = P ∪ {S} represents the set of all
nodes in the network. The video is layered and encoded by
scalable video coding (SVC) [21]. SVC is an extension of the
H.264 codec that can providemultiple video qualities with the
same content. Using SVC technique, a video is scaled into a
base layer and several enhancement layers. A video encoded
by SVC, in short, SVC video, has three dimensions: spatial S
(frame resolution), temporal T (frame rate) and quantization
Q (encoding precision).
We refer to a video layer by a tuple (x, y, z) where 0 ≤
x ≤ |S|, 0 ≤ y ≤ |T|, and 0 ≤ z ≤ |Q| in which |S|, |T|
and |Q| are the maximum number of enhancement layers in
spatial, temporal and quantization dimensions, respectively.
The enhancement layers on top of the base layer increase the
video quality and decoding a specific enhancement layer in
a dimension requires receiving all the previous layers in the
same dimension. The base layer of the SVC video, denoted by
(0, 0, 0), provides a basic video quality and can be decoded
independently. The most significant advantage of SVC is its
adaptability. With SVC, the number of layers, transmitted
from a sender to a receiver, can be adapted depending on
the channel quality. For example, when the channel quality
between a transmitter and receiver is poor, only low layers
of an SVC video are transmitted to the receiver, requiring
low data rate. This adaptation sacrifices the video quality, but
it reduces stalling events in video playbacks which have the
highest negative impact on the QoE [22].
In order to quantify the QoE of the users, we use video
quality metric (VQM) as an objective QoEmeasure [23]. The
VQM is a full-reference, and user validated metric. It assigns
a value between 0 and 1 to the video quality such that the
VQM value closer to 1 shows a higher QoE. Measurements
show that the VQM values for the QoE are highly correlated
with the ones obtained by subjective evaluations [24].
The streamed video in the network is encoded into L layers
and the set L = {1, . . . ,L} shows the set of video layers
where a video layer l requires a transmission rate of d (l) bits
per second. l = 1 represents the base layer which always
has to be transmitted first. Since there are three dimensions
in an SVC video, it is essential to determine which of the
scalability dimensions (spatial, temporal or quantization),
the first enhancement layer (l = 2) belongs to. More pre-
cisely, the first enhancement video layer can be either (1, 0, 0)
or (0, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1). In Sec. IV, we explain how we put
different video layers into order.
For now, we assume that the layers of the video in L are
ordered and decoding a layer l ∈ L implies receiving layer
l−1 as well. A layer l increases the QoE of a user by q(l) and
q = [q(1), . . . , q(l)]T is an L × 1 vector containing the VQM
values of all the layers such that q(l) > 0. We assume that the
values of q(l) are available in the metadata of the video.
A node in the network receives a video layer l ∈ L either
directly from the source or via another node j ∈ P . The video
dissemination flow from the source to all other nodes of the
network forms a tree-graph rooted at the source, called the
broadcast-tree (BT). In fact, the algorithm that finds the BT
finds a route for message dissemination to every node. Since
the video contains L layers, we propose forming L separate
BTs such that each video layer is disseminated by a different
BT, see Fig 1. A user determines howmany of these broadcast
trees she prefers to join. We call a node j ∈ Q that transmits
video layer l to the receiving node i ∈ P the parent node (PN)
of node i for layer l and denote it by a(l)i . Node i is then
referred to as the child node (CN) of PN j for layer l. The set
of CNs of PN j for layer l that receive layer l via a multicast
transmission from PN j is denoted byM(l)j with cardinality
|M(l)j |. Note that a receiving node may have different PNs for
different video layers. Throughout this paper, the transmitting
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FIGURE 1. The proposed approach for the dissemination of a layered
video. Receiving more layers results in higher quality.
nodes on the hops from the source to the PN of a node i are
called the upstream nodes of node i. Moreover, the nodes
toward the edge of the network which rely on node i on
receiving the video are called the downstream nodes of node i.
We define the vector bi = [b(1)i , . . . , b(L)i ] of size 1 × L
with b(l)i ∈ {0, 1} as a binary indicator where b(l)i = 1 shows
that layer l is received by node i. More precisely, we have
b(l)i =
{
1, ∃j ∈ Ni, a(l)i = j, bl−1i ≥ b(l)i
0, otherwise
(1)
in whichNi represents the neighboring nodes of user i. Con-
dition b(l−1)i ≥ b(l)i indicates that the layers of the video must
be received in consecutive order.We define theQoE of a user i
as the aggregated quality of each video layer, i.e.,
Qi = biq. (2)
B. PHYSICAL LAYER AND CHANNEL ACCESS MODELS
From physical layer point of view, every node j ∈ Q in
this network has a transmit power constraint pmaxj . We con-
sider a threshold model such that a minimum signal to noise
ratio (SNR), denoted by γ th, is required at a CN in order to
successfully decode the signal transmitted from its PN. In the
transmission from PN j to CN i, the received SNR at the CN
is calculated by
γi,j =
pTxj gi,j
σ 2
(3)
in which pTxj is the transmit power of PN j, gi,j is the channel
gain between them and σ 2 is the noise power at node i. Con-
sequently, the transmit power at PN j in a unicast transmission
to CN i considering γ th is obtained by
punii,j =
γ thσ 2
gi,j
. (4)
It is assumed that γ th and gi,j for the nodes i and j are the same
for all the video layers. Thus, the minimum power required at
the PN j for transmission to CN i, i.e., punii,j , is independent of
the video layer. The difference comes from different data rates
required by each of the video layers that result in different
energy consumption at the PN.
Due to the power constraint at the nodes of the network,
node i cannot be served by any arbitrary node in the network.
The set of the nodes that can serve node i considering their
power constraint, called the neighboring nodes of node i,
is denoted by Ni and defined as
Ni =
{
j
∣∣∣∣j ∈ Q\{i}, punij < pmaxj }, ∀i ∈ P. (5)
The power required at a wireless transmitter j for proper
operation is composed of two parts; the power pTxj required
for amplifying the signal to be transmitted over the radio link
and the circuitry power required for running internal electrical
modules such as digital to analog converter, digital signal
processing module, etc., denote by pcirj . Unlike the transmis-
sion power that depends on the channel quality between a
transmitter and its receiver, the circuitry power is usually
fixed [25]. We have shown in [26] that beside the transmis-
sion power, the circuitry power has a significant impact on
the energy-efficiency of the network. Hence, we consider the
total power required at a transmitter for layer l as
p(l)j = p(l),Txj + pcirj (6)
in which p(l),Txj is the transmit power required for layer l.
In a multicast transmission, where a PN transmits to multiple
CNs, p(l),Txj is given by p
(l),Tx
j = maxi∈M(l)j {p
uni
i,j }, that
is, the CN in M(l)j that requires the highest unicast power
determines the transmit power of node j for l.
The total energy required at PN j for unicast transmission
of layer l to CN i, denoted by e(l),unii,j , depends on the data rate
d (l) of the layer as
e(l),unii,j =
d (l)
nb
(
punii,j + pcircj
)
Ts (7)
in which nb is the number of bits per symbol transmitted from
the PN j with symbol duration Ts. We assume that nb and Ts
are the same at all nodes and all the video layers. In general,
the energy required for transmission of layer l is then given by
e(l)j = max
i∈M(l)j
{
e(l),unii,j
}
(8)
The vector ej = [e(1)j , . . . , e(L)j ]T is an L × 1 vector with
elements representing the consumed energy at node j for
transmission of each of the video layers.
We define the vector of video layers transmitted by node j
as a 1× L binary vector t j = [t (1)j , . . . , t (L)j ] in which
t (l)j =
{
1, M(l)j 6= ∅
0, otherwise,
(9)
so that the total energy consumed at of PN j is given by
Ej = t jej.
For the channel access scheme, we propose using both time
and frequency where each video layer is transmitted on a dif-
ferent orthogonal channel. For instance, in an OFDM-based
transmission, each video layer can be transmitted over one
or a group of dedicated subcarriers. Besides, we assume
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FIGURE 2. Proposed channel access scheme.
that each channel, which is dedicated to a BT, is time-
slotted and composed of two sections. The first section as a
random-access section used for overhead exchange and BT
construction and the second section as a scheduled section for
video dissemination, see Fig. 2. For example, in the random
access section, a node sends a request to her chosen PN to join
her and receive a certain video layer. This request is sent in the
frequency channel dedicated to the video layer she prefers to
receive. When a node receives a request from another node
and becomes a PN, she reserves a time slot for herself in
the second section, that is, the scheduled section. Further, she
broadcasts the index of the slot in her neighborhood so that
the other PNs avoid using this slot. Such a channel access
enables us to prevent the intra-network interference, as every
PN transmits the packets to its CNs via its own dedicated
channel resources.
Note that our calculations in this paper, for instance, for
energy consumption, are for one second of video. Moreover,
we focus on the initial overlay BT construction given the
preferences of the users, however, since the proposed algo-
rithm is decentralized it can be updated over the time if
required.
III. PROPOSED VIDEO DISSEMINATION ALGORITHM
A. INTERACTIONS OF THE NODES IN THE NETWORK
AND USER PREFERENCES MODEL
In this network, as shown in Fig. 3, for any one-hop transmis-
sion from a PN to a CN (or a group of CNs in a multicast
transmission), a cost is paid to the PN by the CN. The
payment in this network is by tokens that the users already
possess. From the PN’s point of view, the cost paid by the
CN is referred to as the direct reward.
FIGURE 3. A CN receives video layers and pays tokens in exchange.
Definition 1 (Cost): Let c(l)i be the cost that node i pays
for layer l and ci = [c(1)i , . . . , c(L)i ]T represent a vector that
contains the cost paid by node i to the PNs of each layer, then,
the total cost paid by node i to its PNs in order to receive the
video is given by
Ci = bici. (10)
In the next subsection, we explain how the exact value of the
cost, assigned to a receiving user, has to be calculated based
on the energy spent by a forwarding user.
Definition 2 (Direct Reward): Let βi > 0 be the reward
demand coefficient (RDC) of node i. The direct reward of
user i for forwarding layer l to her CNs m ∈ M(l)i , is
defined as
r (l)i = βie(l)i . (11)
βi in (11) as the RDC of node i shows the willingness
of node i to contribute in the network. Lower values of βi
represent an altruistic user while higher values imply that
user i is reluctant for contributing in the network unless she
receives a high reward. The RDC for a user who does not want
to forward the video to others will be set to β = ∞ so that it
will not be chosen as a PN.
By defining an L × 1 vector ri = [r (1)i , . . . , r (L)i ]T con-
taining the direct rewards received by node i for each of the
transmitted layers, the total direct reward obtained by node i
is given by
Ri = t iri = t iβiei. (12)
To capture the impact of a node’s contribution to the
network, we design a taxation mechanism. The taxation
mechanism provides a higher reward for the nodes whose
contribution plays a crucial role in the network. For instance,
in Fig. 4, node i plays a more important role in the network
than node m. Using this mechanism, a tax is paid from a CN
to her corresponding PN in case that the received video layer
by the CN is further transmitted to other nodes. Unlike the
direct reward that depends on the energy that a PN spends,
the taxation mechanism reflects the importance of the role
that a node plays in the network.
FIGURE 4. The interactions among the nodes for receiving the video and
sending the rewards (direct, indirect) back to their PNs.
If node m in Fig. 4 forwards the video layer l to her CNs
and receives a direct reward from them, node i as the PN of
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node m receives an indirect reward from her. The indirect
reward received by PN i is called tax from node m’s point
view, see Fig. 4.We denote the tax paid by nodem to node i for
layer l by x(l)i,m. Using an L × 1 vector xm = [x(1)m , . . . , x(L)m ]T
containing the tax paid by nodem for each of the video layers,
the total tax paid by node m is given by
Xm = tmxm. (13)
Definition 3 (Indirect Reward): The indirect reward
received by PN i for layer l is denoted by ◦r (l)i and given by
◦r (l)i =
∑
m∈M(l)i
x(l)m . (14)
Note that in Fig. 4, node i has two CNs. While node i
receives a direct reward from both of its CNs, the indirect
reward is just received from node m as the CN who further
forwards the video. By defining ◦ri = [◦r (1)i , . . . , ◦r (L)i ]T that
contains the indirect rewards a node receives for forwarding
each of the layers, the total indirect reward received by node i
is obtained by
◦
Ri = t i ◦ri. (15)
Definition 4 (Virtual Income): The virtual income of a
node is defined as the sum of its direct and indirect rewards as
Vi = Ri + ◦Ri = t i
(
ri + ◦ri
) = t i (βiei + ◦ri) (16)
where vi = ri + ◦ri is a vector containing the virtual income
of node i for the video layers.
In this network, every user transfers a portion θ of her
virtual income as the tax to her PNs. The value of 0 ≤ θ < 1
as the tax rate is a design parameter and assumed to be fixed
for all the nodes in the network independent of the user
preference.
Definition 5 (Tax): The tax paid by node i for layer l is
equal to θ times of its virtual income as x(l)i = θ t (l)i v(l)i =
θ
(
r (l)i + ◦r (l)i
)
. The tax vector paid by node i for all the layers
is defined as
xi = θVi = θ t i(ri + ◦ri). (17)
Note that a CN pays a tax just to the PNs of the layers which
have been forwarded to others by her. For the layers that she
does not forward, she pays merely the cost of the video layer.
The notations used through this paper are summarized
in Table 1. Recall that the boldface small letters represent
vectors. Further, the capital letters denote the value associated
to all the video layers, e.g., Ri, that represents the total direct
reward received by user i in exchange for forwarding the
video layers. In Table 1, we only define the scalar parameters,
e.g., r (l)i , the direct reward received by user i for video layer l.
B. GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
In this section, we propose a game theoretic framework for
BT construction. We propose a non-cooperative game model
for video dissemination in the network. The players of the
game are all the nodes of the network except the source,
i.e., the elements of the set P . Since we have a separate
BT for each of the layers, the players of the game for each
layer are denoted by P (l) such that P (l) ⊂ P . The action of
player i for layer l, denoted by a(l)i , is to choose a PN from
whom it receives the video layer l. A(l)i is the action set of
player i for layer l, consisting of the candidate parents of CN
i that can transmit layer l to it. Further, A(l)i ∈ A(l) where
A(l) := ×i∈PA(l)i is the joint action set of the game for layer
l in which× denotes the Cartesian product. The action set of
user i for all the layers is shown by ai = {a(l)i }l∈L and a−i
represents the action sets of all the players except player i.
The action profile of the game over all the layers is denoted
by a = (ai, a−i) ∈ AwhereA := ×l∈LA(l) is the joint action
set of the whole game over all the layers.
There are two constraints that need to be considered in
defining the action set of a user. First, from a tree-graph point
of view, a node i cannot choose node m which is one of its
descendants, as by doing so, a loop occurs in the BT and the
connection between node i and the source will be lost. We
define R(l)i as a set that contains the nodes on the path from
the source to node i for video layer l. Thus, node j can be
a candidate parent for node i for layer l if node i is not on
the path of node j to the source. We set R(l)S = {S},∀l ∈ L
and the route of CN i whose PN for layer l is node j is
given by R(l)i = R(l)j ∪ {i} and h(l)i = |R(l)i | − 1 = |R(l)j |
shows the number of transmission hops from the source to
node i. Second, video transmission over a large number of
hops increases the delay for the nodes at the edge of the
network. Hence, we assume that the number of hops from the
source to a user cannot exceed hmax. Considering these two
constraints, the action set of node i for layer l is defined as
A(l)i =
{
j
∣∣∣∣j ∈ N (l)i , i /∈ R(l)j , |R(l)j | ≤ hmax}. (18)
The set of actions of node i is the joint actions of node i for
all the layers as
ai =
{
a(l)i
∣∣∣∣a(l)i ∈ A(l)i , 1 ≤ l ≤ L}, (19)
in which ∅ represents a null element in case that node i
decides not to receive layer l.
The proposed game is iterative, and the nodes follow the
best response dynamics strategy, that means, in each iteration
of the game, a node updates its action and best-responds to
the actions taken by the other nodes in previous iterations.
A utility function assigns a value to every node based on the
action taken by the nodes such that ui(a
(l)
i , a
(l)
−i) : A(l) →
R,∀i ∈ P in which ui(a(l)i , a(l)−i) is the utility of node i for
layer l and R represents the real numbers. Ui(ai, a−i) =∑
l∈L ui(a
(l)
i , a
(l)
−i) is the overall utility of the node in the
network. The game G is formally defined by the tuple G =<
{P (l)}l∈L, {A(l)i }i∈P,l∈L, {Ui}i∈P >.
The proposed game G is child-driven, that is, a node as a
CN chooses her PNs for different layers. In other words, for
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TABLE 1. Definition of notations used through this paper.
a certain layer l, a node either refuses to receive that layer,
i.e., b(l)i = 0, or if it decides to receive the video layer l, then,
i.e., b(l)i = 1, and a(l)i = j, j ∈ A(l)i .
C. UTILITY FUNCTION DEFINITION
In this section, we define the utility function for the nodes.
The utility function plays a critical role in the decision made
by the users and network optimization. The utility function of
a node must capture three main aspects: the user’s utility must
(i) increase by receiving higher video quality as it improves
user satisfaction, (ii) decrease by the cost the user pays for
receiving video layers, (iii) increase when the user receives a
reward in exchange of forwarding the video. Thus,We define
the utility function of a user i ∈ Q as
Ui := Ui(ai, a−i) = Qi − λ (αiCi + Xi)+ λ
(
Ri+ ◦Ri
)
(20)
in which αi is a user-dependent coefficient that reflects the
importance of the video quality for user i. More precisely,
a lower value for αi degrades the impact of the cost paid by
the user in the utility function versus the video quality she
perceives. Thus, a user who is interested in receiving a high
video quality is represented by a low value of αi. Moreover,
in (20), λ matches the physical dimensions of parameters
and also determines the value of contribution in the net-
work. For example, in a token-based reward, by choosing a
proper λ, the system designer determines how many tokens
per energy unit have to be transferred from a CN to her PN.
For the sake of brevity in the rest of this chapter, we assume
λ = 1.
It should also be remarked that a user can interactively and
subjectively set her preferences, regarding the video quality
she prefers to receive and her level of contribution. The
user’s inputs then need to be turned to objective parameters,
i.e., αi in (20) and βi (in Ri defined in (12)), to be used in the
utility function. Such a conversion is out of the focus of our
work.
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Observation 1: The utility function of node i ∈ P can be
written as
Ui =
∑
l∈L
b(l)i 5
(l),rx
i + t (l)i 5(l),txi (21)
in which
5
(l),rx
i = q(l) − αic(l)i , 5(l),txi = (1− θ )
(
βie
(l)
i + ◦r (l)i
)
.
(22)
Proof: Using (2), (10), (13), (12), (15) in (20) gives
Ui = biq− αibici − t ixi + t iri + t i ◦ri
= bi (q− αici)+ t i
(
ri + ◦ri − θ (ri + ◦ri)
)
. (23)
Expanding (23) over the layers and inserting (11), in it we get
Ui =
∑
l∈L
b(l)i
(
q(l) − α(l)i c(l)i
)
+ t (l)i (1− θ )
(
βie
(l)
i + ◦r (l)i
)
.
If user i decides to receive layer l, then her action is given
by
a(l)i = argmin
j∈A(l)i
c(l)j,i (if b
(l)
i = 1). (24)
Recall that b(l)i is the decision variable of user i for layer l.
The Nash equilibrium (NE) point is assumed as the solution
concept of the game at which none of the players can increase
her utility by changing her decision unilaterally [27]. The
action profile a∗ is an NE of the game if
U (a∗i , a∗−i) ≥ U (ai, a−i), ∀i ∈ P, a∗, a ∈ A. (25)
D. CHOICE OF THE COST FUNCTION AND
CONVERGENCE TO THE NE
The cost function plays a critical role in our proposed mech-
anism. Depending on her cost, the decision of a user in the
network, and consequently, her QoE changes. In this work,
we restrict our attention to the class of budget-balanced cost-
sharing schemes.
Definition 6 (Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Scheme):
In game theory, a cost-sharing scheme is budget-balanced if
the sum of the cost allocated to the users who share a common
resource is equal to the value of the resource (here, to the
reward that has to be paid) [27], that is,
r (l)j =
∑
i∈M(l)j
c(l)j,i . (26)
The cost-sharing scheme to be used in this network must
have the following properties: i) It has to be budget-balanced
so that the reward obtained by a PN (with RDC βi = 1)
is equal to the value of energy she consumes. ii) It has
to guarantee the convergence of the game to an NE.
iii) It must prevent free-riding so that c(l)i,m > 0,∀i ∈
M(l)i . iv) It has to be scaled by the RDC of a transmitter,
so that, the higher the RDC, the higher the cost allocated
to its CNs. v) It must be fair in order to assign a cost
to a CN in proportion to the energy she imposes on her
chosen PN.
We choose the Shapley value as the cost-sharing scheme that
not only satisfies all the conditions above [27] but also it
allows the nodes to perform transmit-power control without
compromising the convergence of the game [26].
Definition 7 (Shapley Value): Assume that the required
direct rewards for every unicast link from the PN j to the mul-
ticast receiving nodes inM(l)j are sorted as 0 ≤ βje(l),unij,1 ≤
· · · ≤ βje(l),uni
j,M (l)j
such that e(l)j = e(l),unij,M (l)j . Then, the cost that
CN i pays to PN j for layer l, based on the Shapley value,
is obtained by [28]
c(l)j,i = βj
i∑
k=1
e(l),unij,k − e(l),unij,k−1
M (l)j + 1− k
, a(l)i = j. (27)
Lemma 1: A non-cooperative cost-sharing game with the
Shapley value as the cost-sharing scheme is a potential
game [29].
Claim 1: The game G converges to an NE.
Proof: The game G that we propose is played for each
layer l ∈ L separately. Although receiving the higher layers
implies receiving the lower layers, the main difference in the
game of layer l compared to layers l ′ > l is the difference
between the number of players, i.e., |P (l′)| ≤ |P (l)|. Hence,
to evaluate the convergence of the game, we can focus on one
layer. The game G, for a given layer l, can be seen as a multi-
cast cost-sharing game in which the nodes choose a resource
with minimum cost to maximize their utility function. Based
on lemma 1, the game G is a potential game that possesses
at least one NE which can be reached by employing the best
response dynamics [30].
Remark 1: The performance of a game theoretic algorithm
is measured by analyzing its worst-case performance, called
the price of anarchy (PoA). Due to the dependency of the
video layers to each other and the complexity of the proposed
framework that includes a joint incentive and taxation mecha-
nism, it is not straightforward to find the PoA of the game G.
Nevertheless, under a special case where the nodes do not
perform power control and use a fixed transmit power instead,
the PoA can be obtained. In such a case, the SV equally
shares the cost of transmission among the CNs of a PN as
1/Mj [26]. Considering a fixed and equal transmit power for
the nodes of the network and by setting θ = 0, L = 1 and
pcircj = 0, the PoA of the game with SV rule is bounded by
O(
√
N log2 N ) [31].
Remark 2: By a proper design, one can ensure that the
probability of collision in a random access channel, shown
in Fig. 2, is negligible. Then, the convergence rate of our
proposed game by employing the best response dynamics is
O(N ) [32].
Definition 8 (Social Welfare): The social welfare of the
game G is defined as
SW = 1|Q|
∑
i∈Q
Ui(ai, a−i). (28)
51336 VOLUME 7, 2019
M. Mousavi, A. Klein: Decentralized Video Streaming in Multi-Hop Wireless Networks
Theorem 1: The social welfare of the game G is given by
SW = 1|Q|
∑
i∈P
bi(q− αici)+
∑
i∈Q
t iβiei
. (29)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
As it can be observed, the social welfare trades the average
QoE of the users and the reward they receive off against the
cost they pay.
Definition 9 (Social Cost): The social cost of the game G
is defined as the total payment of the users for receiving the
service as
SC =
∑
i∈Q
Ci + Xi. (30)
Theorem 2: The social cost of the game G with a
budget-balanced cost-sharing scheme is equal to the total
reward received by the contributing users of the network, i.e.,
SC =
∑
i∈Q
Ri =
∑
i∈Q
t iβiei. (31)
Proof: The proof outline is similar to the proof of
Theorem 1. By summing up the costs paid by CNs, and
since with a budget-balanced cost-sharing scheme, the tax
paid by CNs is equal to the indirect reward received by their
respective PNs, (31) is obtained.
Observation 2: If αi = 1,∀i ∈ P , then the SW in (28) is
given by
SW = 1|Q|
∑
i∈P
biq. (32)
Proof: Using Theorem 2 and the proof of Theorem 1,
it is straightforward to verify (32).
Observation 3: No new token is generated and the total
number of tokens in the network remains unchanged.
Based on Theorem 2, the total cost paid by receiving users
in the network is equal to the reward obtained by contribut-
ing users and the social cost. In other words, the taxation
mechanism that we propose is a way to transfer the tokens
from receiving nodes to the to contributing users. Note that
we assume the nodes possesses enough tokens for payment.
E. DECISION MAKING BY THE PLAYERS IN TWO STAGES
Every node that receives the video, including the source as
the first node, distributes a so-called HELLO message in the
network. This message contains the number of video layers
and the corresponding VQM value of each layer. In addition,
it contains the list of CNs of a PN for each layer and the
corresponding unicast power required for the link to each of
the CNs. The game is child-driven, and after receiving the
HELLO message, a node decides about the number of video
layers she wants to receive and the corresponding PN for
each layer. Before discussing how a node solves its problem,
we present the following corollary.
Observation 4: In (22), we always have5(l),txi ≥ 0. Then,
if a node which possesses a given layer, receives a request
from another node to serve it as a PN, accepting the request
is a dominant strategy.
Corollary 1: The decision of node i is just determined by
b(l)i ,∀l ∈ L.
More precisely, if a node i already possesses a layer, it for-
wards if it receives a request. If it does not possess the layer
while receiving a request, then, b(l)i determines whether node i
receives this layer (and consequently forwards). We define
W (l)i as the set of nodes which request video layer l from
node i and replace t (l)i by 1
(l)
i ∈ {0, 1} as a binary indicator
such that 1(l)i = 1, if {M(l)i ∪W (l)i } 6= ∅.
To make a decision, a node solves its utility maximiza-
tion problem in two stages with different constraints that we
explain using Fig. 4 in the following.
1) STAGE 1: RECEIVE A NUMBER OF AVAILABLE
VIDEO LAYERS
At the first stage, every node i ∈ P maximizes her utility
function by finding the best PNs j ∈ A(l)i ,∀l ∈ L based
on the layers that are currently available at her neighboring
nodes. Then, node i joins the chosen PNs by sending a JOIN
message to them. The optimization problem at a node can be
formulated as an integer programming problem as:
OPT1 : max
bi
∑
l∈L
b(l)i
(
5
(l),rx
i + 1(l)i 5(l),txi
)
(33a)
s.t.: b(l)i ≤ b(l−1)i , 2 ≤ l ≤ L, (33b)
b(l)i ∈ {0, 1}. (33c)
(33b) indicates that to get a specific video layer, receiving
the previous layers is necessary. Recall that the binary indica-
tor 1(l)i = 1 if node i has a CN or a request for video layer l.
2) STAGE 2: REQUEST THE PREFERRED VIDEO LAYERS
Let us assume that node i decides to receive L(r)i layers as a
result of solvingOPT 1. At the second stage, node i assumes
that all the layers of the video are available at all of its
neighboring nodes, i.e, b(l)j = 1,∀j ∈ Ni and solves the utility
maximization problem for L(r)i + 1 ≤ l ≤ L under the new
assumption.
If receiving higher video layers improves the utility of
node i, then, node i is able to increase its utility by receiving
additional layers that are currently not available at its neigh-
boring nodes.1 In this case, node i incentivizes another user,
say node j, to get additional video layers that node iwishes to
receive. More precisely, node i proposes to pay a tax equal to
x(l)i = θv(l)i to node j indicating its interest in receiving video
layer l, see Fig. 4. Then, node j, by having such a proposed
indirect reward from user i (equal to ◦r (l)i = x(l)i ), can get the
video layer l from another user and serve node i (if doing
so improves its utility). To ask a node j ∈ Ni for additional
layers, node i sends a request message (REQ) to node j so that
1Note that, if a preferred video layer was available in the neighboring area,
the node would receive it as a result of solving OPT 1.
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we have i ∈ W (l)j . The optimization problem at the second
stage is written as:
OPT2 : max
bi
∑
l∈L
b(l)i
(
5
(l),rx
i + 1(l)i 5(l),txi
)
(34a)
s.t.: b(l)i ≤ bl−1i , L(r)i + 2 ≤ l ≤ L, (34b)
b(l)i = 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ L(r)i , (34c)
b(l)j = 1, ∀j ∈ A(l)i , l ∈ L, (34d)
b(l)i ∈ {0, 1}, L(r)i + 1 ≤ l ≤ L, (34e)
When it comes to node j to decide, it first finds r (l)j and
◦r (l)j
based on (11) and (14) over the set W lj (instead ofMlj) for
all the layers l ∈ L. Then, it solves the optimization problems
OPT1 andOPT2 as explained above. The same procedure is
performed at every node. Through iterations, when a node
that currently receives layer l finds another PN that improves
her utility, the node sends LEAVE and JOIN messages to
her current PN and new PN, respectively. Table 1 provides a
Pseudo-code that describes the whole algorithm. In this table,
sending a message from CN i to PN j for layer l of the video,
say a JOIN message, is denoted by JOIN : i l−→ j.
F. NOTES ON THE TAX VALUE θ
The tax paid by the users influences the decision of the
nodes and their collaboration. From a designer’s perspective,
the optimum value of the tax rate, denoted by θ∗, is defined as
the value that maximizes the utility of a user and consequently
maximizes the chance for her contribution. For instance,
a proper value of θ can incentivize node i in Fig. 5 which
is located at a critical point of the network so that it provides
further video layers to the nodes located at its downstream.
The optimum value of θ , i.e., θ∗, depends on the structure
of the broadcast-tree and the position of the node in it. Since
the nodes in the network are randomly distributed, and the
broadcast-tree does not have a fixed structure, there does not
exist a unique θ∗ for every node and every structure.
FIGURE 5. A structure in which node i ’s contribution is vital for the
network.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider the structure
shown in Fig. 5 as an instance, and find θ∗ for the node i
which is located at a critical point. This will give us a sense
of how the tax rate has to be set. Let us assume that the nodes
are evenly distribute over the network, so that the energy
Algorithm 1 Decision Making by Node i
1: HELLO message is received at node i
2: for for all l ∈ L do
3: Find A(l)i
4: for for all j ∈ A(l)j do
5: Calculate the unicast energy using (7)
6: Calculate c(l)j,i using (27)
7: Find a(l)i using (24) and corresponding c
(l)
i
8: end for
9: Find ◦r (l)i using (14)
10: Calculate 5(l),rxi and 5
(l),tx
i using (22)
11: end for
12: Solve (33)
13: for for all l ∈ L do
14: if b(l)i = 1 and node i has no PN for layer l then
15: JOIN : i l−→ j, a(l)i = j
16: R(l)i = R(l)j ∪ {i}
17: else if b(l)i = 1 and node i receives layer l then
18: LEAVE : i l−→ current parent
19: JOIN : i l−→ j, a(l)i = j
20: R(l)i = R(l)j ∪ {i}
21: end if
22: end for
23: Solve (34)
24: for for all l ≥ L(r)i do
25: if b(l)i = 1 then
26: REQ : i l−→ j, a(l)i = j
27: Propose x(l)j,i = θ
(
βie
(l)
i + ◦r (l)i
)
28: end if
29: end for
30: Broadcast the HELLO message
consumption of the PNs for a given video layer is equal.
We denote the average reward that a node receives from its
CNs by r¯ = E[βme(l)m ],∀m ∈ Q.
In this structure, the BT consists of H hops in total, node i
has M CNs and the other nodes have one CN. Note that
M = 1 in Fig. 5 corresponds to a line structure.
Lemma 2: In a line structure for a BT, the average utility
function corresponding to video layer l for a node i ∈ P who
is (H − 1) hops away from the edge of the network, is
u¯i(l) = q(l) +
(
1− αi − θ (H−1)
)
r¯ . (35)
Proof: By expanding (24), the average value of the
utility function of node i is given by
u¯i(l) = q(l)−αir¯+(1−θ )
(
r¯+θ
(
r¯+θ r¯+. . .+θ (H−3)r¯
))
= q(l)−αir¯+(1−θ )
(
1+θ (1+θ+. . .+θ (H−3))
)
r¯ .
(36)
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FIGURE 6. The optimum tax rate for node i in the structure given in Fig. 5 versus different values of M and H . (a) The optimum tax
rate vs M for Fig. 5. (b) The optimum tax rate vs H for Fig. 5.
The right side of (36) contains a geometric sum. Hence,
u¯i(l) = q(l)−αir¯+(1−θ )
(
1+θ
(
1−θ (H−2)
1−θ
))
r¯
= q(l)−αir¯+
(
1−θ+θ
(
1−θ (H−2)
))
r¯
= q(l)+
(
1−αi−θ (H−1)
)
r¯ . (37)
Now, the we have the following theorem for θ∗.
Theorem 3: θ∗ that maximizes the utility of node i in Fig. 5
is given by
θ∗ = (H−2)
√
M − 1
M (H − 1) , M ≥ 1, H ≥ 2. (38)
Proof: We assume that node i does not possess video
layer l ∈ L while the other nodes request this layer from
their respective upstream nodes. The optimum value of θ
for motivating node i for contributing to the network is the
value that maximizes its utility function. Similar to (37) in
Lemma 2, the average utility of node i can be written it as
u¯i(l) = q(l) − αir¯ +
(
1− θ +Mθ
(
1− θ (H−2)
))
r¯
= q(l) − αir¯ +
(
1+ (M − 1)θ +−Mθ (H−1)
)
r¯ . (39)
Taking the derivative of (36) with respect to θ leads to
du¯i
dθ
=
(
M − 1−M (H − 1)θ (H−2)
)
r¯ . (40)
Setting (40) to zero results in (38).
Note that, the optimum value of θ is independent of the
RDC of the node as well as the video layer, i.e., rˆ and l,
respectively. We show θ∗ in Fig. 6 for different values of M
andH . Interestingly, for a line structure, the optimum value of
the tax rate is θ = 0. In fact, the selfish behavior of the node i
results in receiving the total reward of its contribution for
itself as it plays a critical role for others. When M increases,
θ∗ increases as well and the best strategy for node i is to
provide the layers for the nodes and benefit from the tax that
the downstream nodes pay.
Observation 5: High values of tax rate θ degrade the net-
work performance.
Proof: Eq. (38) shows that θ∗ for a node like i increases
by the number M of CNs it serves, see Fig. 6. Such a result
is obtained by assuming that all the other downstream nodes
of node i have already received a request from its CN and
sent it to their upstream nodes until the final requests reach
node i. Since node i’s downstream nodes have just one CN
each, θ∗ for them, according to (38) and by considering
M = 1 is equal to 0. Therefore, even if one has to increase
θ for a node like i to increase the chance of its contribution,
nodes i’s contribution depends on receiving a request from
its downstream nodes which will be incentivized with lower
values of θ . Therefore, with an equal tax rate for the whole
network, when θ increases, the overall chance for nodes’
contribution is expected to decrease.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. NETWORK PARAMETERS SETUP
We consider a 1000m × 1000m network in which the nodes
are randomly and uniformly distributed. The number of nodes
varies between 20 and 50, and in each realization of the
network, one of the nodes is randomly chosen as the source.
The path-loss channel model is considered for the channel
gain between any two nodes of the network. Let di,j and d0
be the distance between nodes i and j and a reference distance
for the channel gain, respectively. Further, by η and ζ we
denote the path loss exponent and the signal wavelength,
respectively. Then, the channel gain between nodes i and j
is obtained by
gi,j =
(
ζ
4pid0
)2 ( d0
di,j
)η
. (41)
For the simulation, we set η = 3, ζ = 0.125m and d0 = 1m.
The maximum transmit power and the circuitry power at the
nodes are uniformly distributed over pmaxj ∈ [250, 350] mW
and pcirj ∈ [150, 250] mW, respectively [33]. The minimum
required SNR at the receiving nodes is set to γ th = 15 dB and
the noise power to−90 dBm. The number of bits per symbol
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TABLE 2. Video properties used for the simulation [34].
is set to nb = 2 with symbol duration Ts = 10−6s. The sim-
ulations are carried out in MATLAB2 and the optimization
problems of (33) and (34) are solved using CVX3 along with
Gurobi.4
B. PROPERTIES OF THE VIDEO LAYERS AND THE
ORDER OF THE ENHANCEMENT LAYERS
The videos used through the simulation are three videos
encoded by scalable video Coding H.264/SVC provided by
xiph.org5 calledCrowdRun,BlueSky andParkJoy. The videos
contain three spatial and four temporal layers as enhancement
layers on top of the base layer. The average VQM values of
different video layers of the mentioned videos, as well as
their corresponding data rate required for transmission, are
provided in Fig. 7 [34].
The sequence of the transmission of the enhancement
layers plays a crucial role in the receiving node’s utility.
By considering Fig 7, we can see that receiving one enhance-
ment layer in the temporal dimension improves the perceived
quality much more than receiving one enhancement layer in
the spatial dimension. Besides, the enhancement layers of
the temporal dimension require a lower data rate than that
of the spatial dimension. Low data rate transmission not only
reduces the energy consumption at a PN but also reduces the
cost assigned to the CNs, cf. (27).
Hence, the best order for transmission of the enhancement
layers is to transmit all the temporal layers prior to the spatial
layers. With such an order, the VQM values and the corre-
sponding required data rate of each layer used throughout the
simulations are shown in Table 2.
C. UTILITY FUNCTION SETUP
The parameters captured by the utility function span from the
physical layer (energy) to the application layer (video quality)
and user level (preferences). Therefore, they need to be set
up carefully in order to work together correctly. Since the
2http://mathworks.com/
3http://cvxr.com/cvx/
4http://www.gurobi.com/
5https://media.xiph.org/video/derf/
FIGURE 7. Required data rates and corresponding VQM values for
different layers of H.264/SVC [34]. (a) Data rate. (b) VQM values.
VQMvalues are already normalized between 0 and 1, we first
normalize the energy values. The energy required for unicast
communication (7) between any two nodes are normalized
to a reference energy value denoted by E ref. We define E ref
as the energy a node needs to spend to transmit all the
video layers to a node located at a standard distance, set to
d std = 10m.
To model the willingness of the users to contribute to the
network, we consider the RDC βi ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5,∞} which
correspond to the most altruistic users (50% of the users),
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the average users (25% of the users), the reluctant users (15%
of the users) and the users who do not want to contribute
at all (10% of the users), respectively. Likewise, to model
the preferences of the users regarding the video quality they
wish to receive, we assume that there are three types of users
whose preferences are captured by αi ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1}. These
parameters correspond to the most passionate users in receiv-
ing highest video quality (50% of the users), the average users
(30% of the users) and the users who are not much interested
in paying the price for having high video quality (20% of the
users), respectively. It should also be remarked that we define
the most passionate user as the user whose utility function is
maximized by receiving all the video layers from a transmitter
with β = 1 and the standard distance d std from it. By such a
definition we obtain αi = 0.1.
D. BENCHMARKS
To evaluate different aspects of our design, we compare our
proposed algorithm in terms of energy efficiency and QoE
with the following benchmarks.
1) WITHOUT INCENTIVE
When the incentive is not enabled in the network, the nodes
do not request the video layers which are not available at their
neighboring node. In such a case, the nodes merely maximize
their utility based on the available layers at their neighboring
nodes by solvingOPT1 in (33). Note that, with our proposed
algorithm, the nodes further solveOPT2 in (34) as discussed
in Section III-E.2.
2) EQUAL-SHARE (OVERLAY)
Equal-share is a well-studied cost-sharing scheme for net-
work creation in which the cost of multicast transmission is
equally shared among the receivers. Using the equal-share,
the cost of node i in (27) is given by c(l)j,i = e(l),unij,M (l)j /M
(l)
j . Note
that, in order to guarantee the convergence of an equal-share-
based cost-sharing game to an NE, the transmit power of the
nodes must be fixed which we set to pj = 300mW in our
simulation.
3) FLOODING (OVERLAY)
Flooding is one of the simplest schemes for data dissemina-
tion. With flooding, every receiver re-transmits the packets it
receives, regardless of whether another node in its neighbor-
ing area needs it.
E. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
1) GENERAL PERFORMANCE
Fig. 8a shows the social welfare of the network for different
number of nodes. We evaluate our proposed algorithm for
two different values of tax rate, θ = 0.1 and θ = 0.5.
We further compare our proposed algorithm with the case
without incentive. We see in this figure that the social wel-
fare increases when the network becomes denser. Since in a
denser network the distances between the nodes are shorter
FIGURE 8. The social welfare and the average number of received layers
by the users for different numbers of users. (a) The social welfare.
(b) The average number of received video layers.
on average, the energy required for transmission and, con-
sequently, the cost that every node has to pay for receiving
the video decreases. Therefore, the service is cheaper and
the nodes request higher layers of the video. Furthermore,
the social welfare is higher when the tax rate is low. This is
in accordance with Observation 5 where we expected to have
a better performance with low tax rates.
In Fig. 9, the convergence of the algorithm to an NE is
depicted when there are 20 nodes in the network. In all three
cases, the algorithm converges to an NE where none of the
nodes updates its decision. By enabling our proposed incen-
tive mechanism, higher social welfare and a higher number
of video layers can be obtained through more iterations.
Fig. 10 shows the change in the number of tokens of
each user after constructing the network. The number of
tokens is calculated based the difference in the users’ payment
and income using (20), that is, λ
(
R+ ◦R− C−X
)
assuming
λ = 1. It is assumed that one token per unit of normalized
energy per second is paid by a receiving user to her transmit-
ting user in a unicast transmission. Recall that, in a multicast
transmission the number of tokens that need to be paid are
shared among the receivers. There are 20 nodes in the network
and the abscissa shows the index of the nodes depending on
their proximity to the source. In other words, node 2 is the
nearest user to the source and node 20 has the largest distance.
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FIGURE 9. The convergence to an NE for the social welfare and the average number of received video layers by the users. (a) Social
welfare. (b) Average number of received layers.
FIGURE 10. Change in the number of tokens of the users. The nodes are
indexed based on their distance to the source.
Aswe can see, the number of tokens of the nodes which are
located closer to the source, and typically have a higher con-
tribution, increases. In contrast, the nodes which are located
far from the source end up paying their tokens for receiving
the video and cannot receive tokens from others. With our
proposed mechanism, the curves have a higher slope, and the
number of tokens received by the contributing nodes reaches
a higher value than for the case without incentive. One can
conclude that by using the proposed incentive/taxation mech-
anism in our algorithm, the available tokens in the network
are moved toward the nodes closer to the source whose con-
tribution is vital. This actually results in higher social welfare,
already shown in Fig. 8. It should be remarked that in all the
cases shown in Fig. 10, the total number of tokens in the net-
work are equal, and no new token will be generated according
to Observation 3. The main benefit of our proposed algorithm
compared to the case without incentive is the transfer of the
tokens from the ones who want to have a better quality to the
ones who can contribute.
2) NETWORK CREATION ALGORITHM
The impact of underlay design is studied in Fig. 11 in which
we show the energy consumption in the network versus
FIGURE 11. The energy required for achieving different levels of QoE for
different network creation approaches.
the QoE of the users. We compare our proposed algorithm
with the equal-share-based and flooding-based algorithms
explained in Sections IV-D. Our proposed algorithm that uses
the Shapley value performs better than the other two schemes
for data dissemination. E.g., when there are 20 nodes in the
network, our algorithm requires 68% and 288% less energy
compared to the equal-share and flooding for transmitting
four layers of the video. The gain achieved by our algorithm
in comparison to the equal-share-based algorithm is a result
of transmit-power control at the PNs, cf. Section IV-D.
Further, when there are ten nodes in the network, the per-
formance of the equal-share algorithm is close to the perfor-
mance of our proposed algorithm. The reason is that when the
network is sparse, the transmissions are mostly in unicast for
which the Equal-share and the Shapley value schemes share
the cost of a transmission similarly. In such a case, the only
CN pays the whole cost of transmission [26].
3) IMPACT OF THE ORDER OF LAYERS
In Fig. 12, we compare our proposed order of the video
layers, cf. Table 2, with two other orders; random order
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FIGURE 12. The energy efficiency of the network versus average QoE of
the users for different orders of video layers transmission.
and spatial-first order. As the name suggests, in the latter
case, we first disseminate the spatial layers after the base
layer and then the temporal layers. There are 20 nodes in
the network and as Fig. 12 shows, our proposed scheme
for transmission of the layers has the best performance and
spatial-then-temporal performs the worst among the three
orders. For instance, when the normalized energy consumed
in the network is 2, the average VQM value obtained by our
proposed algorithm is 0.65 while the random approach and
spatial-first achieve 0.20 and 0.28, respectively. As can be
seen in Fig. 7, the path taken by the spatial-then-temporal
scheme, is very expensive. It requires a high data rate while
it improves the QoE marginally. Therefore, the users do
not join the higher layer BTs for quality enhancement, and
consequently, the average QoE is lower. Hence, the order
based on which the enhancement layers are transmitted can
significantly impact the QoE of the users.
4) PREFERENCE-AWARENESS
Finally, to have a better insight into how our proposed
game-theoretic algorithm works, Fig. 13 shows the stream of
different video layers in the network from PNs to their CNs
with and without taking the individual user preferences into
account. Different colors in Fig. 13 represent different video
layers. There are eight layers in total available at the source
and the color of a user shows the number of video layers
received by the user. In this network, there exist six users
including the source. We assume that users 3, 4, and 5 who
are located far from the source are interested in receiving a
high video quality (αi = 0.1, i = 3, 4, 5) while the source
node is not accessible for them. Further, node 2 has low RDC
(high willingness for contribution) with β2 = 0.5 while for
node 1 we have β1 = 1 that represents an average user.
In Fig. 13a, the individual user preferences are ignored and
αi and βi are set to 1 for all the users. Since nodes 1 and 2
are considered homogeneous, concerning the reward that
they ask from their respective CNs, node 4 is indifferent in
choosing its PN and sends its requests randomly to one of the
nodes 1 or 2 for each of the layers.
FIGURE 13. The stream of the video and the number of video layers
received by the users. (a) User preferences are ignored. (b) User
preferences are considered.
In Fig. 13b, we take the individual user preferences into
account. As Fig. 13b shows, node 2, with low RDC (high
willingness for contribution), is chosen by the nodes 3, 4,
and, 5 for providing them the higher layers of the video.
This figure clearly shows the impact of taking the individual
user preferences into account. Using our proposed algorithm,
in contrast to Fig. 13a, the stream of the video is through the
user with high willingness to contribute, i.e., user 2. Further,
the users who require a high-quality video, that is, the users 3,
4, and 5, receive six video layers at the end. In fact, thanks to
the high willingness of user 2 for contribution, the perceived
QoE of the users in Fig. 13b is higher in comparison to
Fig. 13a.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel decentralized game-
theoretic algorithm for video streaming in wireless networks
with one source and multiple receivers. We propose a joint
incentive and taxation mechanism by which the nodes are
motivated to contribute to the network and in return get paid
by their respective receivers. Our design streams the video
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into the network by taking the preferences of individual users
into account regarding their interest in high video quality
and contribution to the network. Further, with our algorithm,
the contributing nodes are not only paid based on the energy
they spend in the network for transmission of video layers to
others but also based on the importance of their contribution
for the rest of the network. Finally, we showed by simulation
that our proposed algorithm converges to an NE, the social
welfare improves, and the users perceive higher video QoE
on average.
APPENDIX A
To find the social welfare of (29), without loss of generality,
we first focus on one layer l ∈ L. Further, for brevity, we omit
b(l)i and t
(l)
i for the nodes which receive or transmit the video
layer l, respectively, as they are equal to 1. Since the source is
the owner of the video and does not pay for the video,5(l),rxS
in (22) for the source is equal to zero. Hence, the utility of the
source node is equal to her virtual income, and by using (20)
for layer l is given by
u(l)S = βSe(l)S + ◦r (l)S . (42)
Using (15), we can extend ◦r (l)S in (42) as
◦r (l)S =
∑
i∈M(l)S
θv(l)m =
∑
i∈M(l)S
θ
(
r (l)i + ◦r (l)i
)
= θ
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
βie
(l)
i + ◦r (l)i
)
. (43)
Then, the utility of the source in (42) is written as
u(l)S = βSe(l)S + θ
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
βie
(l)
i + ◦r (l)i
)
. (44)
Using (24), the sum of utilities of the CNs of the source in
M(l)S is given by∑
i∈M(l)S
u(l)i =
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
q(l)i − αic(l)S,i + (1− θ )
(
βie
(l)
i + ◦r (l)i
))
=
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
q(l)i − αic(l)S,i + βie(l)i + ◦r (l)i
)
− θ
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
βie
(l)
i + ◦r (l)i
)
. (45)
Using (44) and (45), the sum of the utilities of the source node
and its CNs is equal to∑
i∈{S}∪M(l)S
u(l)i =
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
q(l)i − αic(l)S,i
)
+
∑
i∈{S}∪M(l)S
βie
(l)
i +
∑
i∈M(l)S
◦r (l)i . (46)
The very right term in (46) is the indirect reward of the CNs
of the source in M(l)S . Similar to (43), one can extend (46)
toward the edge of the networkwhere the nodes do no forward
the video and the very right term becomes equal to zero.
Hence, by a summation over all the layers, it is straightfor-
ward to find the social welfare given in (29).
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